143 Explaining the effects of compulsory voting on descriptive 144 representation 145 We develop two hypotheses explaining why potential non-voters (i.e. people who 146 would no longer always vote when compulsory voting is lifted) vote significantly 147 less for women. First, we believe that they cast less sophisticated votes and, second, 148 they could be less convinced about the importance of women's political 149 participation. The general level of political sophistication of a voter is a crucial 150 intervening variable in both cases.
151
There is no direct relationship between compulsory voting and voting for women. 152 As indicated by Studlar and McAllister (2002) 
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154 political knowledge and political trust). Voters' level of political sophistication 155 determines three factors: (1) participation in elections, (2) the sophistication of the 156 vote, and (3) the importance attached to women's representation (gender ideology). 157 We hypothesise that a combination of factors 2 and 3 leads to potential non-voters 158 voting significantly less for women. 159 First, both Reuchamps et al. (2015) and Selb and Lachat (2009) found a strong 160 link between political sophistication and potential absenteeism (1). Those who are 161 not interested in politics will not participate in elections. The provision of 162 compulsory voting, however, forces voters with low interest in politics to vote. This 163 could have several consequences on voting behaviour, and first of all, in terms of 164 voter choice (2). The bulk of empirical research refutes the assertion that individuals 165 with low interest in politics will transform into informed and engaged citizens when 166 forced to vote (Fishkin 2009 (2015) suggest: compulsory voting leads to 171 arbitrary votes, as it forces electors to cast any vote. Potential non-voters check off a 172 party or a candidate at random or cast invalid ballots (Hirczy 1994) . 173 Consequences could also be subtler, in the sense that voters with low levels of 174 political sophistication will make less use of preferential voting (i.e. voting for 175 individual candidates instead of a party), when forced to vote in PR systems with 176 intra-party choices (open-list and flexible-list systems). According to the resource 177 model (Marsh 1985) , casting a preference vote is more demanding on the part of 178 voters, since it requires to learn about candidates and compare them (Shugart et al. 179 2005) . Since potential non-voters are less politically sophisticated, they are less 180 likely to make the effort to cast a preference vote. André et al. (2012) , using data 181 from the Belgian 2009 regional elections, indeed come to the conclusion that a 182 higher degree of political interest and resources is more likely to be translated into 183 candidate-based voting. Preferential voting in general, and specifically for women 184 (who often take positions lower down the list), can thus be considered as 185 sophisticated electoral behaviour that requires skills and attitudes (Marien et al. 186 2017) . Above, we already discussed how complex ballot structures discourage 187 people with low levels of political sophistication. 188
Another aspect of the sophistication of the vote is that potential non-voters vote 189 more for established candidates and for incumbents, i.e. existing holders of a 190 political office and heads of list. Both incumbents and candidates in prominent 191 positions on the ballot form automatically draw more votes, even when other factors 192 are controlled for (Maddens et al. 2006 
Research on incumbency voting has, however, demonstrated that sometimes the 201 opposite applies: the higher the turnout at elections, the higher the vote share for 202 challengers of incumbents (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010; 203 O'Malley 2008) . This also seems to apply for compulsory voting: Carreras (2012) 204 study on presidential elections in Latin America found that the score of outsider 205 candidates was about 8% higher in systems with compulsory voting. All these 206 studies, however, do not take into account the complexity of the electoral system 207 (and more in particular, the ballot structure). Most of them focus on the US and the 208 UK, whose majoritarian electoral systems ask the voters a simple and straightfor-209 ward choice for one particular candidate out of a handful of candidates ( 
211
We hypothesise that in more complex electoral systems (PR systems with 212 preferential voting, alternative vote, etc.), which require more effort from the voters, 213 the anti-incumbency effect will be overtrumped by political sophistication. Casting 214 a vote for challengers (lower down the candidate list of a party) is a sophisticated 215 vote and supposes that a voter is informed about a large number of candidates, and 216 potential non-voters are not sufficiently interested in politics to make all these 217 efforts, we posit. Consequently, we expect that these potential non-voters will vote 218 more for established candidates who occupy top-list positions. It is in that respect 219 perhaps no coincidence that in the country sample of Studlar and McAllister (2002) , 220 who found a negative gender voting effect of compulsory voting, only countries 221 with complex ballot structures were included (Belgium, Italy and Australia).
222
This leads to Hypothesis 1: potential non-voters cast less sophisticated votes 223 (more list and head-of-list voting), which is a disadvantage for women, because 224 often they are not at the top of the ballot. 238 exposure hypothesis posits that differences in the role conceptions about women in 239 politics could be explained by differences in exposure to practices of gender 240 equality and to discussions about political underrepresentation of women, which is 241 undoubtedly related to political sophistication. Exposure is, as Jennings notes, 242 driven by media content, social movements and interpersonal relations.
243
The limited number of studies that have focused on the link between 'political 244 gender ideology' and voting behaviour come to the conclusion that there is a 245 significant effect from the former on the latter ( The two hypotheses together suggest that voters who are less politically 254 sophisticated have a higher chance to stay at home when compulsory voting is 255 lifted. Furthermore, as they tend to cast less sophisticated votes and be less open to 256 women in politics, they are less likely to vote for women. Therefore, when these 257 low-interest voters are forced to vote by the provision of compulsory voting, women 258 candidates will be worse off, we posit.
259 Research design and method 260 Belgium is one of the few countries in the world in which a generalised system of 261 compulsory voting exists. This is not strictly enforced: the chances that a non-voter 262 will have to appear before court are extremely small, as well as the possible fines 263 (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). The turnout level has, however, remained constant 264 throughout the years at a level of about 89%, which is far above the average number 265 of turnouts in other countries. 266 Belgium has a PR electoral system with flexible lists: a voter has the choice 267 between casting a preferential vote for one or more candidates (on a single party 268 list) and casting a list vote. Candidates receiving sufficient preferential votes to pass 269 the election threshold are automatically elected. The other candidates can reach the 270 threshold by making use of the list votes. These list votes are distributed to 271 candidates according to their order on the list, offering a substantial advantage to 272 candidates at the top of the list. Preference votes have a direct effect on descriptive 273 representation, as the number of candidates elected solely on the basis of their 274 preference votes have been increasing since the end of the 1990s ). 275 These votes also have an indirect effect in the sense that they are used as a criterion 276 for the selection of ministers and of candidates for the next elections (André et al. 277 2015) . 278
Legislation concerning the presence of women on candidate lists has been 279 introduced in Belgium more than 20 years ago. In 1994, a first quota law was 280 introduced, which stated that a maximum of two-thirds of the candidates on a list 281 could be of the same sex. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement of an equal 282 number of men and women on the list (with a maximum difference of one in case of 283 an odd number of candidates). In addition, one of the two highest positions on the 284 list is reserved for a women candidate. Non-compliance leads to rejection of the list 285 by the public authorities (Meier 2004 ). This quota legislation has led to a substantial 286 increase of women MPs (Wauters et al. 2014) 
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289 parallel use of legal and party gender quotas created a dynamic which opened up the 290 political forum to women more than would have been the case if either party or legal 291 measures alone had been applied.
292
For our empirical analysis, we make use of data gathered by the PartiRep 293 Election Study, which is an electoral panel survey held before (pre-electoral wave) 294 and after (post-electoral wave) the European, federal and regional elections of 2014 295 in Belgium (see: www.partirep.eu). We focus in this paper on the federal (or 296 national) elections, which are generally perceived as the most important ones 297 (Dandoy et al. 2015) . 1 In the pre-electoral wave, based on a stratified sample of 298 eligible voters in two main Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia), face-to-face 299 CAPI 2 interviews were conducted among 2019 respondents (response rate of 45%).
3 300 The same respondents were contacted again for the post-electoral wave shortly after 301 Election Day in which telephone CATI 4 interviews were used. This yielded 1532 302 respondents (response rate of 76%).
5 Respondents were also asked to fill in a self-303 administered mock ballot 6 on which they had to cast exactly the same (preference) 304 votes as on their real voting ballot. This innovative method was previously used in 305 the Irish National Election Studies (McElroy and Marsh 2009) and in a study on 306 Belgian local elections (Pilet et al. 2013 interviewer follows a script provided by a software application.
5FL01
5 All respondents who participated in the first wave were invited to participate in the post-electoral wave. 5FL02 Also, here, the general disadvantage about the representativeness of the sample holds.
6FL01
6 A second wave of the survey was carried out immediately after the elections. With several elections in 6FL02 1 day, people tend to quickly forget which party they voted for and which candidates they cast a 6FL03 preference vote for. Therefore, a few days before the elections, all respondents received three booklets 6FL04 containing mock ballots for the lists and candidates in their district for the election of the European, 6FL05
Flemish or Walloon and federal parliament. Respondents were asked to record this vote immediately after 6FL06 casting their actual vote (for which lists and which candidates). After the elections, they were contacted 6FL07 by telephone (between May 26 and July 1, 2014). Based on the completed mock ballots, respondents 6FL08
could precisely tell what votes they cast. The information on the voting behaviour is thus very accurate.
7FL01 7 We are fully aware that there might be differences between reported voter turnout in surveys and actual 7FL02 turnout (Karp and Brockington 2005) . These differences are caused by social desirable answers and 7FL03 memory failure. The latter is not a problem here as our central variable does not concern voting behaviour 7FL04 in the past, but prospective behaviour. As for the social desirability, there are mechanisms to increase 7FL05 reliability (Belli et al. 1999) . It has been shown that the use of a scale with more than two dichotomous 7FL06 categories (yes or no) helps. This is exactly what we do here (by giving respondents the possibility to 7FL07 choose between always, often, sometimes and never). Results indicate that half of the respondents, 51%, say that they would no longer 313 vote. These respondents indicated that they would 'often', 'sometimes' or 'never' 314 vote. Thus, some of them would still vote, just not always. For the sake of clarity 315 regarding our terminology: we will call those who will always vote 'voters', while 316 the others will be labelled 'non-voters' or 'potential non-voters'. Nevertheless, 317 where enough observations are available for reliable statistical analyses, we also 318 present the results of the variable with 4 categories. 319
Belgium's flexible-list PR system gives voters the choice to cast none, one or 320 multiple preference votes on candidates of one or both sexes within one party list 321 (see also Marien et al. 2017) . Given that the first position on the list is a highly 322 visible position, it is interesting to distinguish between casting one preference vote 323 on the first candidate of the list and casting a preference vote for another candidate 324 lower down the list. These options result in a variable with seven categories: voting 325 for women only, including (1) casting one preference vote on the first candidate on 326 the list, (2) voting for one woman who is not the first candidate on the list, (3) voting 327 for multiple women and voting for men only, including (4) casting one preference 328 vote on the first candidate on the list, (5) voting for one man who is not the first 329 candidate on the list, (6) voting for multiple men, and finally (7) voting for both men 330 and women. This allows us to sketch a rich and multi-faceted picture of voting for 331 women in Belgium, taking into account the complexity of this voting behaviour. We 332 do not have a direct measurement of incumbency, but this is to a large extent 333 captured by analysing the head of list, since about 70% of them are incumbents (Put 334 et al. 2014 ). 335
The attitude about women's role in political life was measured by two items in 336 the questionnaire on which respondents could strongly agree, agree, agree nor 337 disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. The first item was about an equal division 338 of political responsibilities between men and women, the second about the need to 339 have an equal number of men and women represented in parliament. Other gender-related items were included in the questionnaire, but as they mainly concerned the 8FL02 appropriateness of the use of instruments to overcome underrepresentation (such as quota, penalties for 8FL03 parties or companies, and gender neutral education), they are not used in this analysis.
AQ3
Forced to vote, but not for women. 
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We operationalise political sophistication by three variables: political interest (on 341 a scale from 0 to 10), political knowledge (score on five questions to test political 342 knowledge) and political trust (trust in the national parliament on a scale from 0 to 343 10).
Results

345
This section is divided into two parts: in the first part, we describe the differences in 346 voting for women between voters and non-voters. In the second part, we will test the 347 two hypotheses by looking at the sophistication of voting behaviour and support for 348 women's political role.
Descriptive part
350 Two findings immediately become obvious when looking at the differences in the 351 voting behaviour of voters and non-voters (Table 2) Second, the percentage of voters casting at least one vote for a woman candidate 357 is higher among voters than among non-voters (and this gap is also found when we 358 separately consider people who would often, sometimes or never vote). Although 359 voters have ample opportunity to vote for women (as the number of women 360 candidates equals that of men due to quota regulations), 26% of the voters and only 361 16% of the non-voters do so. This allows us to conclude that non-voters vote less 362 often for women than voters. In other words, compulsory voting has a negative 363 effect on the descriptive representation of women. This means that female 364 politicians would have a greater vote share when the votes of potential non-voters 365 would not be taken into account, which is in line with the results of Studlar and 366 McAllister (2002) .
Explanatory part
368 We developed two hypotheses for why non-voters vote significantly less for women: 369 potential non-voters cast less sophisticated votes (by following the lists presented by 370 party elites) (H1) and are less convinced of the quality of women in politics (H2).
371
For the first explanation, we already demonstrated in Table 2 that non-voters 372 generally prefer list voting over preference voting. Now, we will investigate the 373 kind of preference vote more in detail. In particular, we look at whether a vote was 374 cast for the candidate at the top of the ballot, for another candidate on the list or for 375 more than one candidate on the list, and in addition, whether a candidate's gender 376 makes a difference in these kinds of votes. In this case, we decided to restrict our 377 analysis to the dichotomy between voters and non-voters. The number of 
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378 observations is too small per category for the full range categorisation, which would 379 hinder reliable analyses. 380
The results in Table 3 (first three columns) indicate that there are significant 381 differences between voters and non-voters regarding voting for the head of list and 382 voting for multiple candidates. This is a clear confirmation of the 'less sophisticated 383 vote' hypothesis (H1). Votes that suggest more in-depth knowledge about 384 candidates, such as voting for several candidates, are less often cast by non-voters: 385 28% versus 43% for people who would always vote. Conversely, non-voters vote 386 more often for a head of list (47% versus 32% for voters). For this kind of vote, 387 limited political knowledge (about a handful party figureheads) suffices. Although it would be interesting to make a distinction by party preference, we only look at the distribution of votes in general. Owing to the existence of two separate party systems in Belgium (in Flanders and Wallonia) and to the high number of parties due to the PR system, the number of observations by party are too small to conduct reliable statistical analyses (also taking into account that about half of the voters cast a list vote). The same applies to the answer categories ('often', 'sometimes' and 'never') of the non-voters * p \ 0.1; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.001
AQ4
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In the last three columns of Table 3 , we combine the kind of vote and the gender 389 of the candidates voted for. Non-voters do not appear to have a negative bias 390 towards women candidates. They vote significantly more for male top candidates 391 (38 versus 26%) and give significantly less preference votes for several men (5 392 versus 10%) and for several men and women together (20 versus 28%). It is 393 noticeable that there are no significant differences for whether or not to vote for 394 female heads of lists, for one woman and for several women. In sum, the less 395 frequent vote for women is caused by the fact that non-voters do not really 'choose' 396 candidates, but follow the figureheads (mostly men) put forward by the party. 397
Now, we move towards the second explanation by analysing whether there are 398 differences in opinion between voters and non-voters concerning women's political 399 role.
400
The results in Table 4 show that there is almost unanimity that political 401 responsibilities should be shared (statement 1).
9 Differences between voters (89%) 402 and non-voters (88%) are small and non-significant: the percentage of people that 403 disagree is low, both for voters and for non-voters (3%). This is even the case for 404 people who would never vote. In sum, based on the analysis of the first statement, 405 no differences in gender role attitudes between voters and non-voters could be 406 detected.
407
The opinions of voters and non-voters on an equal descriptive representation in 408 parliament (statement 2) do differ significantly, but the direction of difference is not Table 5 Binominal logistic regression with whether or not at least one vote was casted for a woman as dependent variable 
412
In general, some minor differences in how voters and non-voters perceive women 413 in politics appear, but these differences are small and not always unequivocal. This 414 seems to suggest that gender role attitudes could only provide a minor explanation 415 for differences in voting for women between voters and non-voters.
416
This is confirmed if we run a binominal logistic regression with whether or not at 417 least one vote was cast for a woman as dependent variable (see Table 5 ). We 418 include gender and region (Flanders or Wallonia) as control variables. Over the 419 years, fewer women have been elected in Wallonia than in Flanders (IGVM 2016) 420 and there is a higher proportion of voters casting preference votes only for men in 421 Wallonia than in Flanders (47.9 versus 43.2%) (André et al. 2010 ). This could be an 422 indication of a political culture that is less open to women taking up prominent roles 423 in politics.
424
The results of this regression analysis demonstrate that the effect of compulsory 425 voting on voting for women remains significant when two variables about gender 426 role attitudes are added (Model 1). The odds of a non-voter casting a vote for 427 women is only 0.654 times the odds of a voter doing so (even when controlling for 428 the effect of gender role attitudes, gender and region). This supports our results 429 discussed above: non-voters vote less for women, but not because they are not 430 convinced of a prominent role for women in politics.
431
In Model 2, we add the three political sophistication variables to the analysis. 432 Political trust is the only of the sophistication variables that has a significant 433 effect.
10 As expected, the significant effect of compulsory voting disappears once 434 we control for political sophistication. This suggests that the effect of compulsory 435 voting is mainly driven by this political sophistication, as we already demonstrated 436 above.
437
In Models 3 and 4, we insert the original variable with four categories (always, 438 often, sometimes, and never) into the analyses. The effects are almost the same 439 (significant effect for voting without mandatory voting, which disappears when 440 political sophistication is added to the analysis), but we clearly see that the effect is 441 more outspoken for voters who would never vote if compulsory voting were to be 442 lifted.
Conclusion
444 The presence of women in parliaments (and factors influencing this) has been high 445 on the research agenda for several decades. We focused on the provision of 446 compulsory voting, a specific institutional variable that has often been overlooked 447 when analysing the effects of electoral rules on women's representation. While it 10FL01 10 We also ran a logistic regression analysis with an interaction term between gender and the political 10FL02 sophistication variables, but since these interactions were not significant, the added value of this analysis 10FL03 is limited. In order to not to confuse the readers, it was left out of this article. The first is that potential non-voters also vote less sophisticatedly (more list and 459 head-of-list voting), which is a disadvantage for women, because often they are less 460 likely than men to be on top of the ballot. Potential non-voters often lack the skills 461 and attitudes needed to cast a sophisticated vote. These expectations are confirmed 462 by our results: non-voters vote significantly more for top candidates (who are more 463 likely to be men) and give significantly less preference votes to candidates lower 464 down the list (this is especially true for ballots that combine votes for both men and 465 women). The less frequent vote for women by potential non-voters is caused by the 466 fact that these kinds of voters do not really 'choose' candidates, but follow the 467 figureheads (mostly men) put forward by the party. 468 Second, we pointed to differences in voter attitudes about the political role of 469 women. We hypothesised that voters with low levels of political sophistication are 470 less convinced about the political role of women, and precisely these kinds of voters 471 are also more likely to abstain if compulsory voting is lifted. We found, however, no 472 clear evidence for this explanation. Our results demonstrate that the effect of 473 compulsory voting on voting for women runs mainly through the sophistication of 474 the vote, and not so much through the gender ideology of (potential) non-voters. The 475 effect of compulsory voting on voting for women remains significant when we 476 control for gender ideology. 477
Our findings have three further implications. 478
First, there is a clear trade-off between boosting women's descriptive represen-479 tation (by abolishing compulsory voting) and keeping women's formal represen-480 tation on the current level (by maintaining compulsory voting). We showed that 481 compulsory voting has a negative effect on the descriptive representation of women, 482 while earlier research ( AQ2 Reference Reuchamps et al. (2015) was mentioned in the manuscript; however, this was not included in the reference list. As a rule, all mentioned references should be present in the reference list. Please provide the reference details to be inserted in the reference list and ensure that all references are cited in alphabetical order.
AQ3 Table [ 1] was received; however, no citation was provided in the manuscript. Please provide the location of where to insert the citation in the main body of the text. Otherwise, kindly advise us on how to proceed. Please note that tables should be cited in ascending numerical order in the main body of the text.
AQ4 Please provide a definition for the significance of bold values in the Table 3. 
